Two-population replicator dynamics and number of Nash equilibria in random matrix games

We study the connection between the evolutionary replicator dynamics and the number of Nash equilibria in large random bi-matrix games. Using techniques of disordered systems theory we compute the statistical properties of both, the fixed points of the dynamics and the Nash equilibria. Except for the special case of zero-sum games one finds a transition as a function of the so-called co-operation pressure between a phase in which there is a unique stable fixed point of the dynamics coinciding with a unique Nash equilibrium, and an unstable phase in which there are exponentially many Nash equilibria with statistical properties different from the stationary state of the replicator equations. Our analytical results are confirmed by numerical simulations of the replicator dynamics, and by explicit enumeration of Nash equilibria.Comment: 9 pages, 2x2 figure

Dynamics of a spherical minority game

We present an exact dynamical solution of a spherical version of the batch minority game (MG) with random external information. The control parameters in this model are the ratio of the number of possible values for the public information over the number of agents, and the radius of the spherical constraint on the microscopic degrees of freedom. We find a phase diagram with three phases: two without anomalous response (an oscillating versus a frozen state), and a further frozen phase with divergent integrated response. In contrast to standard MG versions, we can also calculate the volatility exactly. Our study reveals similarities between the spherical and the conventional MG, but also intriguing differences. Numerical simulations confirm our analytical results.Comment: 16 pages, 3 figures; submitted to J. Phys.

Minority games, evolving capitals and replicator dynamics

We discuss a simple version of the Minority Game (MG) in which agents hold only one strategy each, but in which their capitals evolve dynamically according to their success and in which the total trading volume varies in time accordingly. This feature is known to be crucial for MGs to reproduce stylised facts of real market data. The stationary states and phase diagram of the model can be computed, and we show that the ergodicity breaking phase transition common for MGs, and marked by a divergence of the integrated response is present also in this simplified model. An analogous majority game turns out to be relatively void of interesting features, and the total capital is found to diverge in time. Introducing a restraining force leads to a model akin to replicator dynamics of evolutionary game theory, and we demonstrate that here a different type of phase transition is observed. Finally we briefly discuss the relation of this model with one strategy per player to more sophisticated Minority Games with dynamical capitals and several trading strategies per agent.Comment: 19 pages, 7 figure

Random replicators with asymmetric couplings

Systems of interacting random replicators are studied using generating functional techniques. While replica analyses of such models are limited to systems with symmetric couplings, dynamical approaches as presented here allow specifically to address cases with asymmetric interactions where there is no Lyapunov function governing the dynamics. We here focus on replicator models with Gaussian couplings of general symmetry between p>=2 species, and discuss how an effective description of the dynamics can be derived in terms of a single-species process. Upon making a fixed point ansatz persistent order parameters in the ergodic stationary states can be extracted from this process, and different types of phase transitions can be identified and related to each other. We discuss the effects of asymmetry in the couplings on the order parameters and the phase behaviour for p=2 and p=3. Numerical simulations verify our theory. For the case of cubic interactions numerical experiments indicate regimes in which only a finite number of species survives, even when the thermodynamic limit is considered.Comment: revised version, removed some mathematical parts, discussion of negatively correlated couplings added, figures adde

On the transition to efficiency in Minority Games

The existence of a phase transition with diverging susceptibility in batch Minority Games (MGs) is the mark of informationally efficient regimes and is linked to the specifics of the agents' learning rules. Here we study how the standard scenario is affected in a mixed population game in which agents with the `optimal' learning rule (i.e. the one leading to efficiency) coexist with ones whose adaptive dynamics is sub-optimal. Our generic finding is that any non-vanishing intensive fraction of optimal agents guarantees the existence of an efficient phase. Specifically, we calculate the dependence of the critical point on the fraction $q$ of `optimal' agents focusing our analysis on three cases: MGs with market impact correction, grand-canonical MGs and MGs with heterogeneous comfort levels.Comment: 12 pages, 3 figures; contribution to the special issue "Viewing the World through Spin Glasses" in honour of David Sherrington on the occasion of his 65th birthda

Stationary states of a spherical Minority Game with ergodicity breaking

Using generating functional and replica techniques, respectively, we study the dynamics and statics of a spherical Minority Game (MG), which in contrast with a spherical MG previously presented in J.Phys A: Math. Gen. 36 11159 (2003) displays a phase with broken ergodicity and dependence of the macroscopic stationary state on initial conditions. The model thus bears more similarity with the original MG. Still, all order parameters including the volatility can computed in the ergodic phases without making any approximations. We also study the effects of market impact correction on the phase diagram. Finally we discuss a continuous-time version of the model as well as the differences between on-line and batch update rules. Our analytical results are confirmed convincingly by comparison with numerical simulations. In an appendix we extend the analysis of the earlier spherical MG to a model with general time-step, and compare the dynamics and statics of the two spherical models.Comment: 26 pages, 8 figures; typo correcte

Dynamics of adaptive agents with asymmetric information

We apply path-integral techniques to study the dynamics of agent-based models with asymmetric information structures. In particular, we devise a batch version of a model proposed originally by Berg et al. [Quant. Fin. 1 (2001) 203], and convert the coupled multi-agent processes into an effective-agent problem from which the dynamical order parameters in ergodic regimes can be derived self-consistently together with the corresponding phase structure. Our dynamical study complements and extends the available static theory. Results are confirmed by numerical simulations.Comment: minor revision of text, accepted by JSTA

Statistical mechanics and stability of a model eco-system

We study a model ecosystem by means of dynamical techniques from disordered systems theory. The model describes a set of species subject to competitive interactions through a background of resources, which they feed upon. Additionally direct competitive or co-operative interaction between species may occur through a random coupling matrix. We compute the order parameters of the system in a fixed point regime, and identify the onset of instability and compute the phase diagram. We focus on the effects of variability of resources, direct interaction between species, co-operation pressure and dilution on the stability and the diversity of the ecosystem. It is shown that resources can be exploited optimally only in absence of co-operation pressure or direct interaction between species.Comment: 23 pages, 13 figures; text of paper modified, discussion extended, references adde

Market response to external events and interventions in spherical minority games

We solve the dynamics of large spherical Minority Games (MG) in the presence of non-negligible time dependent external contributions to the overall market bid. The latter represent the actions of market regulators, or other major natural or political events that impact on the market. In contrast to non-spherical MGs, the spherical formulation allows one to derive closed dynamical order parameter equations in explicit form and work out the market's response to such events fully analytically. We focus on a comparison between the response to stationary versus oscillating market interventions, and reveal profound and partially unexpected differences in terms of transition lines and the volatility.Comment: 14 pages LaTeX, 5 (composite) postscript figures, submitted to Journal of Physics